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Abstract 
This article argues that during World War I, the Syrian and Lebanese periodical press 
in the American mahjar created new space for transnational political activism. In São 
Paulo, Buenos Aires, and New York City, diasporic journalists and political activists 
nurtured a new nationalist narrative and political culture in the press. In a public 
sphere linking mahjar to mashriq, what began with discussions about Ottoman 
political reform transformed into nationalist debate during the war. Intellectuals 
constructed and defined the “Syrian” and “Lebanese” national communities in the 
diaspora's newspapers, but the press also played an important practical role in 
promoting and shaping patterns of charity, remittances, and political activism 
towards the homeland. Using materials from this press, the article concludes that the 
newspaper industry's infrastructure enabled new patterns of political activism across 
the mahjar, but also channeled Syrian efforts into a complex alliance with France by 
the eve of the Mandate. 
 
 
 
“The	   sentiments	   of	   honor	   and	   loyalty...	   are	  
incompatible	  with	  these	  individuals	  who	  sold	  their	  
profession...	   to	   the	  highest	  bidder.	  Hirelings	  of	   the	  
foreigners,	   they	   tried	   to	   inculcate	   the	  
inexperienced	   youth	   with	   the	   same	   subversive	  
ideas	  that	  they	  had	  entertained.”	  	  
-­‐	  Jamal	  Pasha	  on	  Syria's	  Journalists,	  1916.1	  
 
On 6 May 1916, the military government of Jamal Pasha, “the bloodletter,” 
convicted some forty Arab journalists and intellectuals of treason. Using 
documents seized from the abandoned French Consular Office in Beirut, the 
Ottoman government demonstrated that prominent members of Syria's 
Decentralization movement had colluded with France to end Turkish rule in 
Syria and Lebanon. The condemned shared several attributes: they were 
reformers who had called for greater Arab participation in imperial 
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administration; they were journalists and newspaper editors who participated 
in the nahda; and lastly, they each had connections to the Syrian diaspora. 
Such links to Syrian communities in Cairo, Paris, and the Americas spared 
some of the condemned their lives. Many fled during the first months of 
World War I, and could only be convicted in absentia.2  
Jamal Pasha hanged twenty-one “traitors” in Beirut and Damascus, in a 
public demonstration. Also paying the price of talking reform, the presses at 
Ahmed Tabbarra's al-Ittihad al-ʿUthmani, ʿAbd al-Hamid al-Zahrawi's al-
Hadara, and the Khazin brothers' al-Arz closed quietly. Only Muhammad 
Kurd Ali's pro-Ottoman al-Muqtabas remained.3 The following month, a 
disastrous famine visited Mount Lebanon, depleting entire villages of their 
populations. Death warrants remained on the books for many of Syria's 
intellectuals, who continued to combat the Ottoman state from New York 
City, São Paulo, Buenos Aires, Paris, and Cairo.  
The greatest irony of this moment is that although Jamal Pasha had 
correctly identified the Syrian press as a political force connected to the 
diaspora, he failed to consider the Reform movement's largely Ottomanist 
outlook. The 1913 Syrian Congress in Paris brought together reformers from 
Hizb al-Lamarkaziyya, the Beirut Reform Society, al-Fatat, and other parties 
comprised chiefly of journalists from Damascus, Beirut, Cairo, Alexandria, 
and New York City. Having used the diaspora's press to reach consensus, the 
Congress laid out its platform: immediate administrative reform, greater 
Arab participation in local affairs, and the protection of political rights 
(including those in the diaspora) within the Ottoman Empire.4 Istanbul sent 
its own delegate, who reported that these resolutions would assist in 
negotiations between the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress 
(hereafter C.U.P.) and Arab reformers. 
Instead of reform, the following months brought war. The empire 
entered World War I, and Jamal Pasha arrived in Syria, placing it under 
military occupation by 1915. He immediately stepped up censorship over 
Syria's press, instituting bans on diasporic periodicals, closing printing 
houses, harassing and even executing journalists.5 The clampdown alienated 
the C.U.P's former partners in the mahjar. Activists once associated with the 
Reform movement mourned their dying homeland, and called for its 
emancipation from the “Turkish yoke” (nīr al-atrāk) for the first time. In the 
struggle for Independence, the mahjar became a critical front where activists 
waged battles in the press. This essay outlines the story of transnational 
political activism in the Syrian mahjar, paying special attention to the myriad 
ways that the Arabic language press in Brazil, Argentina, and the United 
States served the Independence project. 
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TRANSNATIONAL MEDIA:  THE MAHJARI PRESS AS 
STRUCTURE 
Ever since Ju ̈rgen Habarmas first linked the periodical press to the rise of the 
liberal middle classes, historians have analyzed the connection between the 
private newspaper press and public civil discourse. 6  Benedict Anderson 
illustrated the press’s capacity to generate patriotic “imagined communities:” 
political identities that a middle-class readership expressed in relation to the 
modern nation-state. 7  In the mahjar, the emigrant bourgeoisie literally 
constructed the nation through the press: they organized politically, 
developed financial and educational structures, and nurtured a nationalist 
culture and narrative in its pages. With the Ottoman government's hostility 
to Syrian journalism during the war, emigrants living “behind the sea” (warāʾ 
al-baḥr) gained increasing control over the Syrian press, gaining power to 
define what it meant to be “Syrian” or “Lebanese” in a post-Ottoman context. 
As the diaspora's major print capitals, Syrian publishing houses in São 
Paulo, Buenos Aires, and New York City comprised critical sites for public 
opinion and nationalist activism during the War. Beyond newspapers, 
publishers produced nationalist propaganda for the Syrian reading public.8 
Political parties used such media to disseminate open letters, pamphlets, and 
books. These texts were printed in Arabic, French, English, Portuguese, and 
Spanish for both Arab and foreign audiences. Their content evolved during 
the conflict, and the mahjar’s political culture resembled an ongoing 
discussion between the activists around the world. 
Publishing houses also provided new social spaces oriented towards 
patriotic politics and middle-class activism. They had their own subscription-
based libraries, printing dime novels, translations of European literature, 
biographies, political poetry, and language primers.9 They often featured 
reading rooms for the oration and performance of texts; this mirrored similar 
institutions in Beirut, Jerusalem, Damascus, and Cairo.10 Some engaged in 
everyday printing, producing stationary and letterhead for local Syrian 
businesses. Such measures offset the cost of producing a newspaper.11 Most 
importantly, the mahjar's publishing houses founded their own literary 
societies and book clubs. Meeting weekly to discuss poetry, history, and 
politics, these fraternities offered young men a social outlet as well as a 
worldview that carried patriotic and even nationalist content. Many such 
groups discussed in this essay—Hizb al-Ittihad al-Lubnani, Jamaʿiyyat al-
Nahda al-Lubnaniyya, and Hizb al-Dimuqrati al-Watani—began as 
fraternities attached to publishing houses. 
During World War I, political, intellectual, and activist networks cohered 
around their respective newspaper presses. In such a setting, the journalism 
industry itself became a space where an emerging Syrian and Lebanese 
middle class abroad asserted its primacy in political debates. Newspapers 
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were simultaneously sites of contest and patronage: in New York City, 
Naʿum Mukarzil subsidized Lebanese writers in his Arabic daily al-Huda, a 
paper officially linked to his own political committee Jamaʿiyyat al-Nahda al-
Lubnaniyya. For aspiring young writers, membership in a club like the 
Nahda Lubnaniyya and access to the press came hand in hand; participating 
in the politics of patriotism hinged on both aspects. In the end, newspapers 
were greater than the output of their individual presses; they created their 
own intellectual gravity and governed both political discourse and nationalist 
activism. 
The mahjar's press was an important political institution that fostered 
transnational networks across the diaspora. As such, it facilitated the 
continuous circulation of intellectuals, activists, and professionals. Readers 
across continents could order issues of al-Huda, al-Saʾih, or Abu al-Hawl 
remotely through mail-order subscription, and party activists brought copies 
with them as they moved across the mahjar. Their peripatetic movements 
established a circuit that enabled activism across the mahjar. The 
transnational nature of this press also reflected in the mahjar's economy: 
newspapers like Sallum Mukarzil's al-Majalla al-Tijariyya al-Suriyya al-
Amirkiyya in New York combined political commentary with descriptions of 
employment markets, economic conditions, and prices for items like cotton, 
coffee, cloth, tobacco, and ʿaraq.12 
As transient activists and journalists imagined Syrian and Lebanese 
communities into existence, the diaspora's newspapers transformed them 
into epicenters for nationalist politics. But, unlike Anderson's imagined 
communities, the process by which the periodical press enabled patriotic 
nationalism was anything but consensual. Rather, in the mahjar the press was 
a place of semiotic contest, a place where the diaspora's activists variously 
became “Syrian” or “Lebanese” by engaging in discursive warfare for the right 
to define and represent the community abroad. National symbols, historical 
narratives, and language became rhetorical munitions within a “political and 
cultural minefield” where Syrians in Brazil, Argentina, and the United States 
competed for access to the diaspora's collective voice.13  
If the press created new political spaces, it also constrained emigrant 
agency, channeling it towards specific a political praxis. 14  Newspapers 
empowered a transnational Syrian middle class that then pressed its claims to 
representative legitimacy in international fora. At the same time, the press 
provided structures that governed Syrian activism in important ways. First, as 
continued out-migration dispersed the Syrian reading public, periodicals and 
political parties needed to maintain active networks of support and 
information across a widening transnational space. Second, this reading 
public's middle-class identity influenced how politics functioned: committee-
based activism, complete with a faith in “public opinion” and the power of 
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petition took center stage over ideological or mass party activism. Emigrant 
activists relied on newspapers to popularize political viewpoints and enervate 
the diasporic public into supporting new visions of the homeland as a matter 
of patriotic duty. Whereas the periodical press created the Syrian and 
Lebanese diasporic “public,” the objectives of the mahjar's transnational 
activists were also governed by their trade, prompting them to seek to shape 
and deploy Syrian public opinion (itself a new political force) towards a 
nationalist vision of the Levant.  
 
THE PRESS IN THE MAHJAR AS TRANSNATIONAL 
ARCHIVE 
As a body of sources, the mahjari press gets short shrift in historiographies of 
interwar Syria and Lebanon in favor of colonial documents. A practical 
reason for this stems from how historians frame Middle Eastern history. 
Within the Area Studies framework popularized by the postwar American 
academy, studies of the region have focused on the relationship between 
territorially defined nation-states and the societies they produce. Mobile 
peoples: nomads, migrant laborers, or emigrants, fit only problematically 
within such a perspective, not least because as migrants, they undermine the 
“methodological nationalism” which presumes the immutability and 
inviolability of the homogenous nation-state. 15  The states of Syria and 
Lebanon emerged only after World War I, on maps drawn by European 
powers seeking an amiable colonial solution for the post-Ottoman Levant. 
The mahjar and its activists played a complicated role in the construction of 
this geography, but “landlocked” methodological lenses typical of Area 
Studies presume salt water to be more boundary than conduit for political 
change.16 This essay takes the opposite tack, arguing that there is no place 
better suited to explore the utility of transnational modes of inquiry than in 
the history of nationalism. Emigrants participated in drawing the borders, 
building the states, and defining the nations of Syria and Lebanon. Like other 
nations with sizable diasporas, patriotic politics and nationalist ideas from 
the mahjar figured among the most consequential of remittances during the 
War.17 
This article draws on the mahjar's periodical press to revise Albert 
Hourani's classical thesis that linked Arab nationalism directly to the 
nineteenth-century nahda,18 work already begun by C. Ernest Dawn, Rashid 
Khalidi, Hasan Kayali, and James Gelvin, who describe Eastern 
Mediterranean nationalism as a creature of World War I. 19  Important 
explanations for why Syrians made recourse to nationalist politics, who did 
so first, and how Arab politics worked during the interwar years exist in the 
mahjar, but historians are just beginning to seek them there.20 They do so 
within an emerging historiography that challenges reigning notions of 
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Middle Eastern social geography. Bringing the mahjar into conversation with 
Syrian and Lebanese social history, however, requires identifying new 
archival sources. The press presents one such archive: it is indigenous, readily 
accessible, and intrinsically transnational. 
Because political parties, charitable organizations, and intellectual clubs 
printed their minutiae in the press, these periodicals provide an inside look 
into the values, culture, and politics of the mahjar. The meeting minutes, 
election results, propaganda, and local news printed in the press provide a 
story of Syrian life abroad that is simply not accounted for in either Ottoman 
and French records. Activist groups are particularly obscured because they 
operated clandestinely and escaped government detection. 21  The press 
delivers empirically by recording political goings-on, transnational 
communications, and intellectual discourses. At the same time, the press 
presents its own blind spots that need accounting for. The mahjar's 
newspapers were widely distributed and poorly preserved, creating an issue 
of survivability that requires a creative methodology. Although New York 
papers al-Huda, Mirat al-Gharb, al-Bayan, and al-Saʾih maintained complete 
archives, other titles: al-Faraʾid (Buenos Aires), al-Zaman (Buenos Aires), 
and Abu al-Hawl (São Paulo) have left only a few issues scattered around the 
world. However, the emergence of transnational Syrian press syndicates 
during the War allowed for the reproduction of important news stories, 
making it possible to read editorials by Syrians in Egypt, Argentina, or Brazil 
by reading the New York papers. Similarly, even where newspapers have not 
survived, supplemental materials produced by these publishing houses have. 
Propaganda, poetry, and personal narratives remain and are more 
successfully preserved in research libraries. 
In this spirit, the following pages explore the press's imbrication with 
Syrian and Lebanese nationalist activism during World War I. Following on 
the heels of a familiar story: the emergence of the Syrian Reform movement, 
its transformation into distinct and competing Arab, Syrian, and Lebanese 
nationalisms, and subsequent splintering of activist groups in 1919, a fresh 
look at this history from the diaspora's perspective reveals how the 
collaborations and competitions of Syrian and Lebanese activists abroad 
influenced politics at home. Intellectual, financial, and political networks 
between São Paulo, Buenos Aires, and New York City proved fertile to a new 
mode of politics hinging on the power of public opinion. However, as these 
networks took on ideological content, new fissures emerged between activists 
who fundamentally disagreed over Syria's future and the place of Lebanon 
within (or apart from) it. In the end, the French Foreign Ministry exploited 
these new political divisions, and in doing so harnessed the diaspora as a 
critical political constituency for its own ends in the Levant. 
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THE SYRIAN PRESS ABROAD: FROM REFORM TO 
NATIONALISM 
From its inception in 1909, the Syrian Reform movement had close ties to the 
diaspora, and nearly all of its early leaders were newspapermen. The printing 
profession reflected the values of a new middle class in Syria. Raised on the 
principles of the nineteenth century nahda, these men were educated, urban, 
and liberal in their attitudes concerning political participation. They were 
well read in the Arabic classics as well as in European sociology, political 
philosophy, and history. In the Syrian press in Egypt, for example, the editors 
of al-Hilal, al-Funun, al-Muqtataf, and al-Muqattam enthusiastically 
translated pieces by Leo Tolstoy, Maxim Gorky, and T. S. Carlyle into Arabic, 
and encouraged their readers to purchase full-length copies from their 
respective publishing houses.22 Reading such materials provided more than 
recreation; it became a marker of class identity, and a prerequisite to 
participating in Syrian and Lebanese social discourse in the late Ottoman 
context. In Cairo (Syria's oldest “colony”), young Syrian and Lebanese 
members of reading rooms and publishing houses supported Ottoman 
constitutionalism under the banner of the Young Turks. In June 1908, 
Syrians in Cairo held a street festival in honor of the C.U.P, and touting the 
revolution as the beginning of an awaited Ottoman constitutional flowering 
and a realization of the ethos of al-nahda.23 The heady feeling would not last, 
and in 1909 a second coup within the C.U.P. brought a centralist faction to 
power under Enver, Talat, and Jamal Pasha and changing the ruling regime's 
focus. This alienated Syrian intellectuals, and in Cairo, Beirut, and Damascus, 
new questions about whether the new Ottoman government would protect 
Arab local interests and autonomy emerged. 
The diaspora's first reform party, Cairo's Hizb al-Ittihad al-Lubnani, 
emerged from a falling out between the Syrians of Cairo and Lebanese 
mutasarrif Yusuf Franco Pasha. In 1909, Syrian emigrant publishers Yusuf 
Sawda and Antun al-Jumayyil (who wrote for Beirut's al-Bashir, and Cairo's 
al-Ahram and al-Zuhur)24 arrived in Mount Lebanon to investigate recent 
rumblings that the C.U.P. planned to alter Lebanon's administrative status. 
Rumors that 1864’s Règlemente Organique would be discarded in favor of 
direct imperial control caused controversy among Syrians living in Cairo and 
Alexandria, who advocated for the extension of administrative autonomy for 
their homeland. Arriving at Franco Pasha's office, al-Jumayyil and Sawda 
presented their case for autonomy. They were told, “you must understand 
that we are an Ottoman wilaya, and that the Lebanese must also assume this 
status.”25 Yusuf Sawda recalled storming out of the mutasarrif's office, leaving 
al-Jumayyil to awkwardly take his leave with grace. The pair returned to 
Cairo, and in December 1909 convened with the colony's most prominent 
intellectuals, newspaper editors, and professionals. The Hizb al-Ittihad al-
Lubnani emerged with two headquarters: in Cairo under Iskandar ʿAmmun, 
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Daud Barakat (al-Ahram), and Antun al-Jumayyil, and in Alexandria under 
Yusuf Sawda.26 This was not an ideological political party, but instead a 
pragmatic political committee that represented a Syrian and Lebanese urban 
professional class abroad. Because the Ittihad Lubnani was essentially a 
syndicate representing fluid, sometimes inchoate political interests, the 
organization never became a mass political party. The Egyptian branch's 
membership peaked at  2,000 by 1919; more common for the mahjar were 
smaller pockets of several dozen professionals, writers, and functionaries 
representing Ittihad Lubnani locally. 27  The organization’s agenda was to 
protect Mount Lebanon's administrative privileges (imtiyāzāt idārīyya) as 
outlined by the Règlemente Organique of 1864, to support the extension of 
local rights and home-rule, and to establish Arabic as the administrative 
language.28 As such, the Ittihad Lubnani was the first emigrant party to 
articulate a reformist, decentralization platform; two years later, it seeded the 
Hizb al-Lamarkaziyya in 1911. 
Hizb al-Ittihad al-Lubnani set the tone for organizing across the mahjar, 
and parties that came after mirrored its organizational structure. First, the 
Ittihad Lubnani's leadership valued and nurtured links with the press, which 
it saw as the pathway for developing and domesticating Syrian public 
opinion. The party's executive committee was itself made up of journalists: 
Antun al-Jumayyil (al-Ahram), Daud Barakat (al-Ahram), Khayrallah 
Khayrallah (al-Hurriyya), Iskandar and Daud ʿAmmun (al-Mahrusa), Yusuf 
Sawda, and Auguste Adib Pasha. These men commanded editorial opinion in 
the mahjar, and they used this hold over the press to publicize the 
Decentralization question from 1909 until the First Syrian Congress of 1913. 
Additionally, the Ittihad Lubnani's leadership was itself transnational: Syrian 
writer Khayrallah Khayrallah founded a chapter in Paris in 1909, while 
Naʿum Mukarzil (al-Huda) was a close affiliate in New York.29 By 1912, the 
Ittihad Lubnani also had client branches operating in Rio de Janiero, São 
Paulo, Buenos Aires, Mendoza (Argentina), New York City, and Boston. 
Because the Ittihad Lubnani commanded the mahjar's intellectual space, 
the group easily publicized its agenda without taking on additional financial 
burdens. It maintained no regular treasury, and rather than fundraising, the 
executive committee simply reached out to partners in the Americas and 
their publishing houses. Professional and political partnerships emerged 
simultaneously in this context, and in more remote places in the mahjar, 
publishers and journalists had everything to gain from joining Hizb al-Ittihad 
al-Lubnani: fodder from Cairo's most respected newspaper and access to 
party structures and activist networks. In effect, the Hizb al-Ittihad al-
Lubnani created the mahjar's first informal media syndicate, a network that 
crossed continents but was exclusive to Ittihad members.30  
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In New York City, al-Huda owner Naʿum Mukarzil served as Ittihad 
Lubnani's closest American partner. Freike-born and Jesuit-educated, 
Mukarzil had lived in Cairo before emigrating to the United States with his 
brother Sallum in 1890.31 In New York City's “little Syria,” Naʿum and Sallum 
Mukarzil founded several publications which drew heavily on material 
written in Cairo: al-ʿAsr,  al-ʿAlam al-Jadid, and al-Huda, which became one 
of New York's most successful Arabic-language dailies by 1905.32 In 1910, 
Sallum Mukarzil developed the first Arabic wax linotype machine which 
made small-scale printing inexpensive and widely available in the mahjar.33 
Al-Huda adopted the technology and expanded its operations beyond 
newspapers, printing books, translations, stationary and propaganda, which 
were featured in its own library in Brooklyn.34 By 1911, Mukarzil established 
his own political party with colleagues at al-Huda. Called Jamaʿiyyat al-
Nahda al-Lubnaniyya, the organization began as a reform party linked to the 
Ittihad Lubnani. And like the Ittihad Lubnani, it would later champion 
Lebanese independence from the Ottoman Empire.35  
The Jamaʿiyyat al-Nahda al-Lubnaniyya espoused a political outlook 
Mukarzil had already popularized in the press. Inspired by the nineteenth-
century nahda and closely affiliated with the Decentralization movement,36 
the Nahda Lubnaniyya's original purpose was the retention of Lebanon's 
administrative privileges within an Ottoman context.37 Mukarzil's approach 
mirrored that of the Ittihad Lubnani, save one major exception: the Nahda 
Lubnaniyya lobbied Ottoman authorities but also sought Western partners to 
leverage claims against Istanbul. Mukarzil cultivated alliances with French 
policymakers in particular, and he saw France as the Lebanon's natural 
guarantor for autonomy and independence.38 This distinguished Mukarzil 
from his compatriots in the Ittihad Lubnani, who avoided direct collusion 
with the French, British, or other foreign powers. Mukarzil had no such 
scruples; he was amused when the Ottoman government denounced his 
group as “French spies, who have penetrated everywhere and have mingled 
with all (political) currents as informers to the Government in Paris.”39 
Despite important differences in perspective, Mukarzil's Nahda 
Lubnaniyya remained an important partner to the Ittihad Lubnani, and this 
closeness is reflected in the party's organizational structure. Like the Ittihad, 
the Nahda Lubnaniyya's leadership was transnational and made up largely of 
journalists. As a political organization, the Nahda Lubnaniyya operated in 
several places at once, bringing together Syrians and Lebanese across a 
transnational, diasporic space. Mukarzil depended on his own professional 
contacts in establishing satellite chapters across the Americas. He leaned 
especially on al-Huda's Istanbul correspondent, Ibrahim al-Najjar, who spent 
most of his time on steamships shuttling between Istanbul, Paris, Cairo, and 
New York between 1908 and 1913. al-Najjar's work as al-Huda's 
correspondent brought him in touch with prominent Ottoman figures like 
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Yusuf Franco Pasha and prominent Syrian emigrés like Khayrallah 
Khayrallah and Shukri Ghanim, who introduced him to French diplomats 
like Raymond Poincarre and Jean Gout.40 In 1912, al-Najjar and Shukri 
Ghanim founded Nahda Lubnaniyya's Paris chapter. He simultaneously 
corresponded with São Paulo journalists Asʿad Bishara, Antun Jabbara, 
Asʿad Bitar, and Shukri al-Khuri (the controversial editor of the Francophile 
daily Abu al-Hawl) who opened a Brazilian chapter.41 By 1914, the Nahda 
Lubnaniyya had twenty-nine active satellites operating across the United 
States, Canada, Mexico, Columbia, Brazil, and Costa Rica.42 Ibrahim al-
Najjar's movements traced the lines of an emerging Syrian newspaper circuit; 
his status as a journalist gained him access to the mahjar's most important 
personalities and supplied him with a ready route along the mahjar's 
intellectual geography. 
The Nahda Lubnaniyya also mirrored the Ittihad Lubnani in the way it 
collected and distributed funding. The membership's modest annual dues 
were maintained in the Faour Bank in Brooklyn, where Doumit and Daniel 
Faour (both Nahda members) maintained the books. But the party only 
collected larger sources of revenue when a project was identified, a strategy 
that lent the organization the flexibility to raise money across international 
borders informally, making them less vulnerable to foreign interference.43 
Such flexibility brought the Nahda Lubnaniyya vitality, but it also brought 
conflict. Sometimes satellite chapters opposed Naʿum Mukarzil's political 
designs, and Mukarzil himself was not known for compromise. 
Disagreements over Mount Lebanon's future bubbled over during the War, 
most dramatically in Paris where a serious disagreement between Mukarzil 
and Shukri Ghanim led the latter to break ties with the Nahda completely. 
However, the Nahda Lubnaniyya's early efforts were directed against C.U.P. 
centralism and towards French assistance, positions flexible enough to bring 
disparate personalities like Mukarzil and Ghanim into close collaboration. 
The start of World War I in 1914 changed everything in the Syrian 
colonies, and the Ittihad Lubnani's concerns shifted as well. As the Ottoman 
government abrogated and concluded capitulations treaties with Western 
Powers, Mount Lebanon's 1864 Règlement Organique was among those left 
on the cutting room floor. In response, the Ittihad Lubnani altered its official 
stance towards the Ottoman state, changing its Constitution to state that the 
party would “solicit the absolute Independence of Lebanon, within its natural 
boundaries (ḥudūd ṭabīʿīyya), under the Protection of the Powers.”44 The 
Hizb al-Ittihad al-Lubnani transformed from a reform party to a separatist 
group. Soon after declarations of independence rang out from Lebanese, 
Syrian, and Arab nationalist groups in the mahjar's newspapers. In Brazil, 
Nahda Lubnaniyya leader Shukri al-Khuri's image appeared on a party 
circular. Declaring war on the Ottoman state, al-Khuri hoisted a new 
Lebanese flag: a green Cedar on a white background that quickly became the 
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South American mahjar's standard. al-Khuri urged Brazil's Lebanese to join 
both the Nahda Lubnaniyya and the Allied Powers in overthrowing the 
Turks. al-Khuri concluded that by partnering with the Entente (duwal al-
tafāhum), that “with their victory, we will see the betterment of our 
homeland.”45 
 
TRANSNATIONAL MODES:  ACTIVISM IN THE MAHJAR 
Shortly after arriving in Syria in 1915, Jamal Pasha introduced martial law 
and placed new limits on the press, closing local opposition newspapers and 
banning many periodicals from the mahjar. At times his regime enforced an 
even harder line, hiring local thugs to ensure compliance: neither the fire that 
burned down al-Nasir's press nor the beating of al-Barq's editor in Beirut was 
formally investigated.46 During the War's early months, Syrian journalists 
abroad equated the loss of press freedom with the loss of their homeland.47 
Similarly, Jamal Pasha's unpopular conscription policy led many to assist 
draft dodgers and their families in hiding from Turkish soldiers.48 In both 
cases, the press was presented as a national forum and the place where 
Syrians and Lebanese could act out in political ways; the circumscription of 
this space was therefore seen as an act of war. By 1916, the mahjar's activists 
turned to another mode of national service: deploying its own sons militarily 
through the French-led Légion d'Orient. 
The Légion d'Orient was an irregular regiment comprised of Syrian, 
Lebanese, and Armenian volunteers from across the diaspora. Syrian and 
Lebanese leaders abroad worked with French Foreign Consuls in New York, 
Buenos Aires, and Montevideo to drum up volunteers for this force in 
Summer 1916. The Légion d'Orient was primarily the brainchild of Shukri 
Ghanim, who coordinated the recruitment drive from his home in Paris. The 
effort brought together political parties from across the ideological spectrum: 
Naʿum Mukarzil's Nahda Lubnaniyya and the Ittihad Lubnani participated 
with enthusiasm. There were, however, some groups that refused to 
participate: Salomon Busader, the president of Ittihad Lubnani's Buenos 
Aires chapter, defected from his party because he refused to work with Shukri 
Ghanim or his local agent, the Emir Emin Arslan.49 
The Syrian press reported on the Légion d'Orient's movements from 
France in 1916 to Cyprus, and finally its disembarkation to Palestine in 1917. 
Newspaper editors played a critical role in publicizing the recruitment drive, 
but also in sponsoring individual volunteers. In March 1916, a young Homsi 
named Hafiz Khizam traveled from his adopted home in São Paulo to the 
French Consul in Buenos Aires to enlist in the French military. Najib Trad, 
editor of al-Jadid and officer in Argentina's Ittihad Lubnani paid Khizam's 
passage.50 In return, Khizam sent Trad regular letters as he fought alongside 
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French soldiers, and his letters appeared in a syndicated series in al-Jadid 
(Buenos Aires), al-Saʾih (New York), and Correspondence d'Orient (Paris).51 
On the other hand, the recruitment drive caused considerable 
disagreements among Syrians abroad. Weeks into the French Consul's 
campaign in Buenos Aires, Najib Trad sought to expand the drive to Rosario, 
in the Argentinian interior. On 4 April 1916 the arrival of Trad's mission 
sparked an ugly confrontation between pro-Ottoman Syrians and Légion 
d'Orient supporters. In Rosario as elsewhere, support for the project often fell 
along sectarian lines: Maronites and Greek Orthodox Christians largely 
supported the French-led regiment; Muslims typically opposed it. Sunni 
leaders accused the Légion's boosters (and by extension the French) of 
harboring sectarian motivations; a noontime confrontation outside a Rosario 
Church devolved into a riot involving hundreds.52 One Ottoman supporter, a 
Muslim, was killed, another sixteen were hospitalized and dozens more 
arrested by Argentine authorities.53 The Argentine government then accused 
the French of inciting violence in its territory; a street fight with transnational 
dimensions threatened Argentina's diplomatic equilibrium with France. 
While Syrians abroad coordinated, and sometimes combated, a growing 
alliance with France through the Légion d'Orient, events at home took a sharp 
turn for the worse. Jamal Pasha's 1916 executions of journalists were quickly 
followed by a food rationing policy that left Syria's civilian population facing 
shortages. By June 1916, the shortage produced a famine that ultimately 
killed between 350,000 and 500,000 in Mount Lebanon and western Syria.54 
The diaspora's newspapers collected letters from compatriots in Beirut, 
Homs, Zahle, and the Mountain describing mortality rates that often reached 
fifty or sixty percent.55 Town-based mutual aid societies began raising relief; 
groups like the Homsi Fraternity (al-Ikhaʾ al-Homsi), the Tripoli Society (al-
Jamaʿiyya al-Trabulsi), or Maronite Priest Habib Estefan's group Lebanese 
Youth (Jamaʿiyyat al-Shabiba al-Lubnaniyya) collected relief for their home 
cities.56 
As more about the disaster's extent became known, it became clear that 
famine relief required broader organization across the mahjar's many 
colonies. Both the Nahda Lubnaniyya and the Ittihad Lubnani jumped into 
the breach, relying on their established networks to remit both money and 
aid to the homeland. A case in point is the Jamaʿiyya Lajna Aʿanat al-
Mankubin al-Suriyya wa-Lubnan (hereafter called the Lajnat al-Mankubin), 
headquartered in New York City. This committee was formally linked to a 
political party called the Ittihad Suri, but in 1916 it collected monetary relief 
from committees in Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico and printed its progress in 
al-Saʾih, a political daily edited by ʿAbd al-Massih Haddad.57 Haddad was 
skeptical of the village-based approach to charity, owing to the unequal 
distribution in aid,58 and the corruption of local distributors.59 His group, the 
42 Stacy Fahrenthold 	  
Lajnat Mankubin, worked with the Red Cross and U.S. Department of State 
transfer money to Syria.60 In Buenos Aires, Khalil Saʿadeh arranged for his 
group, al-Jamaʿiyya al-Suriyya, to fund-raise for the Lajnat Mankubin; his 
own newspaper, al-Majalla, reported the Committee's progress.61  In the 
summer of 1916, the committee raised over $13,000 across the Americas.62  
Meanwhile, in Paris, Shukri Ghanim raised some 50,000 Francs, 
entrusting it to French intermediaries for delivery to Syria. Most of these 
funds were collected from Syrian colonies in South America under the 
auspices of Ghanim's new group, the Comité Central Syrien (al-Lajna al-
Suriyya al-Markaziyya). In June 1917, two delegates, Jamil Mardam Bey and 
Dr. Qaysar Lakah toured Syrian colonies in South America, raising funds for 
both relief and the Légion d'Orient.63 They did so with Ghanim's blessing and 
the fiscal support of the French Government, and apparently this pair was so 
successful in inspiring Syrian solidarity that even the German Embassy sent 
an envoy to rendezvous with them in Buenos Aires (where they were 
loathsomely rebuked). 64  Although the Lakah-Mardam delegation drew 
opposition from some emigrant leaders who resented Ghanim's growing 
influence (especially from his estranged partner Naʿum Mukarzil), 65 
Ghanim's efforts placed him on the French Foreign Ministry's radar and laid 
the basis for future cooperation. Jean Gout and Stephen Pichon, for example, 
both saw Ghanim as a valuable Syrian partner, and as a barometer for Syrian 
public opinion.66 
The press served the relief effort with an organizational space to appeal 
directly to the public, a public that in many ways had only come to 
consciousness just years before. The Lajnat Mankubin drafted weekly letters 
to the Syrian mahjar as a whole: appeals for aid, volunteers, or for 
information from Syria obtained through the paper’s readership. Letters from 
home were rare, but when they arrived in Brazil, Argentina, or New York, 
they were often published. 67  Of course, these letters were subject to a 
tightening Ottoman censorship policy.68 That the news of Jamal Pasha's 
executions did not make headlines for weeks—but the famine did so 
immediately—reminds the historian that Ottoman censors were acutely 
aware of the power of public opinion.69 
If the relief drive brought together activists across the mahjar, emigrant 
leaders also made choices that sowed the seeds for future discord. 1916 
proved a major turning point between the parties and the public: the tone of 
reportage on the calamity became decidedly political. This happened in two 
stages. First, the recruitment campaign for the French-led Légion d'Orient 
and the famine relief drive prompted many Syrian leaders abroad to partner 
with the French Foreign Ministry in unprecedented, and controversial, ways. 
Second, alliances emerging between the mahjar's political parties and the 
Great Powers shook loose unresolved questions about Syria's post-Ottoman 
Transnational Modes and Media 43 
future, and the place of Lebanon within (or apart from) it. Naʿum Mukarzil's 
Nahda Lubnaniyya described a pressing need for Lebanese independence and 
autonomy from Syria; Ghanim's Comité Central Syrien instead referred to 
Lebanon as “Syria's heart.” 
Long-standing transnational connections between emigrant leaders and 
the press broke apart, and over the course of 1916 and 1917 reconstituted 
themselves along ideological, nationalist lines. To illustrate, Naʿum Mukarzil 
and Shukri Ghanim both supported an alliance with France, and the Nahda 
Lubnaniyya promoted a Francophile perspective. In 1916, however, the two 
men quarreled over the prospect of an independent Lebanon separate from 
Syria, and Ghanim closed the Paris chapter, taking his local partners with 
him. The following year he established the Comité Central Syrien; Mukarzil 
became his most vocal opponent. 70  Around the diaspora, Ghanim's 
supporters followed suit, forming a new coalition: the New York Lajnat 
Mankubin was reborn as the Lajna Tahrir Suriyya wa-l-Lubnan under the 
leadership of Ayyub Tabet, Amin Rihani, and Jubran Khalil Jubran. Amin 
Rihani traveled to Mérida, Mexico, and founded a local branch of the Lajna 
Tahrir in late 1917 to counter Mukarzil's long-standing influence there.71 In 
São Paulo, Nami Jafet founded the Comité Patriotico Syro-Libanenze.72 In 
Egypt, Haqqi bey al-ʿAzm established the Lajnat al-Suriyya al-Lubnaniyya fi-
Misr. 73 In 1918, Ghanim collected telegrams from each of these parties 
proclaiming their support for a greater Syrian state, “federated and integral.. 
from the Taurus Mountains... to the Mediterranean Sea,” under French 
protection. Ghanim remitted the letters to the French Foreign Ministry as 
proof of the mahjar's political voice.74 
The Ittihad Lubnani saw similar seismic shifts. Disagreements over 
whether to cultivate Western support led President Iskandar ʿAmmun to 
resign his post in 1917.75 After ʿAmmun's defection, the Hizb al-Ittihad al-
Lubnani narrowed its political vision, calling for a Lebanese state 
independent from Syria under a Lebanese Republican administration, a 
position which put it at loggerheads with Shukri Ghanim, the Comité Central 
Syrien, and the French government. 76  By the time British, French, and 
Hashemite troops expelled the Ottomans from Syria in October 1918, the 
mahjar's politics realigned along the, at times contradictory, questions of 
French support and the nature of Lebanon's relationship to Syria. This new 
state of affairs gave the French government its choice of Syrian partners, 
empowering it to interfere in the mahjar's politics more than ever. And 
although the French closely aligned with Shukri Ghanim during the War, 
they made a dramatic about-face during the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. 
During the War, the French Foreign Ministry looked at the Lebanese 
independence movement with suspicion, and it regularly collected 
intelligence on activists operating in the mahjar.77 French intelligence officers 
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in Egypt suspected the Hizb al-Ittihad al-Lubnani of being puppets to British 
(or Hijazi) interests. 78  French Minister to Egypt LeFevre-Pontalis, for 
instance, described Ittihad Lubnani leader Yusuf Sawda as a Lebanese 
emigrant “sans notoriété” in a letter to Stephen Pichon, concluding that his 
claims that “France will grant Lebanon its absolute independence” should not 
be taken seriously.79 France preferred to work its influence through Shukri 
Ghanim and his U.S. American clients, a policy which sparked occasional 
confrontations activists who resented Ghanim's Syrian unionist sympathies. 
In Buenos Aires, for instance, the local Ittihad Lubnani branch (Union 
Libanense) threatened to end their endorsement of the Légion d'Orient unless 
France moved to support a national Grand Liban “within its historical, 
geographic, and natural boundaries” and agreed to take the Lebanese 
independence movement more seriously.80 During the War, such protests fell 
on deaf ears in Paris. 
Continued confrontations with the Ittihad Lubnani prompted the 
Foreign Ministry to launch an investigation in January 1919. The resulting 
report reproduced the language of the party's charter, particularly their aim 
for “the complete independence of Lebanon, under protectorate of the 
Powers, within its natural, historical, and geographical boundaries.”81 In a 
significant reversal of former French policy, the report opined that the Hizb 
al-Ittihad al-Lubnani's goals more closely resembled France's own interests in 
the Levant than those of France's current partner, Shukri Ghanim. It advised 
cultivating the Ittihad Lubnani as a more pliable French ally, and cited the 
party's control over the press as contributing to its status as “the largest, most 
influential, and most capable of all Lebanese societies.”82  
Meanwhile, Shukri Ghanim's Syrian unionist bloc that had seemed so 
strong in 1917 began to shake apart. That Ghanim stood firm in his faith in 
France as Syria's protector gave his partners pause, especially with the 
additional revelation that France had committed to plans to partition Syria 
into “spheres of influence” (the Sykes-Picot Agreements). In 1919, the 
unionist movement splintered: a “New Syria Party” (Hizb al-Suriyya al-
Jadida) seeking complete Syrian independence emerged under Faris Nimr in 
Cairo,83 and Philip Hitti, George Khayrallah, and Abraham Rihbany in New 
York.84 Made up largely of Syrian Protestant College graduates, the Hizb al-
Suriyya al-Jadida advocated for a “Syrian homeland, federated and 
independent,” with “no tutelage, no protection” from foreign powers.85 If any 
assistance would be necessary, the Hizb al-Suriyya al-Jadida held that the 
Syrian people should seek help from the United States. In a party manifesto, 
Abraham Rihbany argued that United States of America’s supposed status as 
the only “anti-colonial” world power should inspire sympathy for Syrian 
independence; after all, it was in keeping with Wilsonian principles.86  Ayyub 
Tabet elaborated on this notion, arguing that as a young nation “in its 
childhood,” the U.S. was putatively best positioned to give Syria what it 
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needed: technical assistance (musāʿida) without imperial tutelage (wiṣāya).87 
Tabet styled himself as the United States’ Syrian partner, even proposing to 
conduct a formal treaty of friendship between a united Syrian federation and 
the United States of America. Tabet's public statements incensed French 
diplomats; French Minister LeFevre-Pontalis scoffed at the irony of asking an 
allegedly “anti-colonial” America to take mandate over the East before 
dismissing the Hizb al-Suriyya al-Jadida as British agents.88 
Around the same time, in Buenos Aires, Syrian journalist Khalil Saʿadeh 
founded a South American branch called al-Hizb al-Dimuqrati al-Watani. 
Saʿadeh had been a colleague of Faris Nimr's at the Syrian Protestant College 
in Beirut. Like Nimr, Saʿadeh had socialist leanings and spent the War 
developing an anti-colonial reading of events back home. In January 1919, 
Saʿadeh issued a public call for a reassessment of the diaspora's political 
goals, and he announced his intention to host a General Syrian Congress in 
Buenos Aires.89 The Conference reflected Saʿadeh's desire to form a secular 
patriotic coalition against French domination: “we are no longer Muslim, nor 
Christian, Druze, nor Jew,” Saʿadeh wrote, “for the gallows are erected for all 
of us together; the famine killed all indiscriminately. We must now form... a 
single coalition. We are now Syrians, Lebanese, and Palestinians, without 
factions, religions, or sects.”90 
Saʿadeh's Syrian Congress occurred on 25 February 1919, and was timed 
as a mahjari repudiation of Daud ʿAmmun's first Lebanese Delegation then 
in Paris. Its resolutions-- that Syria be granted complete independence (al-
istiqlāl al-tām), without French “protection” (ḥimāya), and that it be given a 
seat at the League of Nations-- laid the basis for Saʿadeh's Hizb al-Dimuqrati 
al-Watani. The Party's slogan, “A bedouin's independence is better than 
civilized bondage” (al-istiqlāl maʿa al-badāwa khayr min-l-ʿabūda maʿa al-
ḥiḍāra), played off of the Shukri Ghanim's frequently invoked idea that Syria 
was not yet ready for independence and needed development first.91 Saʿadeh's 
emphasis on “the rights of barbarians” (ḥuqūq al-barābara) to national 
independence, and his argument that sovereignty precedes progress 
(tamaddun) set him apart from other Syrian activists in 1919. 
Meanwhile, activists in Ghanim's coalition argued bitterly in the press 
over the their troubled reliance on France. In January 1919, Shukri Ghanim 
made public statements authorizing France to speak on Syria's behalf at the 
Paris Peace Conference, and in doing so, he ignited a firestorm among 
activists abroad.92 Najib Diab wrote a furious article in Mirat al-Gharb 
proclaiming that Shukri Ghanim held no authority to claim the mahjar's 
voice and acted in bad faith.93 In return, Mirat al-Gharb sustained a barrage 
of angry letters from Ghanim's many supporters.94 Undeterred, Diab then 
published a mock proclamation thanking the Comité Central Syrien for 
making partition and imperialism Syria's inescapable fate. 95  Diab then 
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mocked Ghanim's partners in the Americas as traitors (khāʾinīn) who would 
sell their homeland to the highest bidder.96 
Content with its new partners in the Ittihad Lubnani, the French Foreign 
Ministry simply stopped taking Shukri Ghanim's calls. Relations between the 
Comité Central Syrien and the French Government cooled dramatically in 
1919. Shukri Ghanim submitted numerous letters of protest, especially 
against the First Lebanese Delegation headed by Hizb al-Ittihad al-Lubnani 
member Daud ʿAmmun and its proposed “mutilation of Syria” which would 
“excite religious sentiments” between Christians and Muslims.97 The First 
Lebanese Delegation presented a case for a French-mandated Grand Liban, 
within its “natural, historical, and geographical borders” as defined by the 
Ittihad Lubnani. 98  Daud ʿAmmun also connected Lebanon's territorial 
integrity to emigration question, concluding, “The territories that these 
borders encompass are a condition of our existence; without them, we have 
no commerce, no agriculture, and our people are forced into emigration.”99 
In response, Shukri Ghanim denied that ʿAmmun's delegation had spoken 
the true feelings of the mahjar. He implored that France reject ʿAmmun's 
plan and instead “hasten the fulfillment of her Mandate (over Syria) so that 
the damage caused by these regrettable rivalries, competitions, and 
unjustifiable claims may be swiftly repaired.”100  
In a French Foreign Ministry memo, Jean Gout applauded Ghanim's zeal 
and his work with the Légion d'Orient, but advised that the Ministry distance 
itself from the Comité Central Syrien and pursue plans for a French-
mandated Grand Liban.101 France then denied Shukri Ghanim his request for 
travel documents to enter Syria to organize political forces there. During the 
War, Ghanim pressed the advantages that his distance from Syria afforded 
him, but in 1919, distance became a means by which the French government 
contained his political influence. Realizing his wings were clipped, Ghanim 
bewailed Syria's “dismemberment by powerful hands,” accusing the French 
of harboring sectarian interests. “We would like to add,” Ghanim concluded, 
that the Comité would support “a renewal of our fidelity to our secular 
friend” should France return to its senses.102 
Meanwhile, France sponsored a second Lebanese Delegation under 
Maronite Patriarch Ilyas Huwayyik. In advance of the Delegation's October 
1919 arrival, the Church and the French Foreign Ministry solicited letters 
from each of the mahjar's communities in the Americas. Petitions and 
statements of support poured into the Maronite Patriarchate in Bkerke from 
Argentina, Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, and the United States, where they 
were bound together for presentation to the Paris Peace Conference as proof 
of the diaspora's endorsement for an independent Lebanon.103 The Ittihad 
Lubnani and the Nahda Lubnaniyya both assisted with this effort, and 
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Naʿum Mukarzil actually arrived in Paris and requested to accompany 
Patriarch Huwayyik on the diaspora’s behalf.104 
The Maronite Patriarch's entry into the politics of the Peace Conference 
was far from undisputed, though. While Syrian unionists from Shukri 
Ghanim to Khalil Saʿadeh fretted about Syria's dismemberment along the 
lines proposed by Ittihad Lubnani, even within the Lebanese Independence 
movement there existed conflicts over the Church's place in politics. In South 
America, many of the Ittihad Lubnani's chapters strongly opposed the 
clergy's involvement; in Chile, the party's leadership refused to endorse 
Huwayyik altogether, saying that they favored Daud ʿAmmun's delegation 
and saw no reason for a second. When given the ultimatum to either support 
the Patriarch or lose their vote, they drafted a telegram to the French, saying 
that left “without a true delegate,” the Lebanese of Chile “unanimously 
resolve to entrust defense of their interests to (Stephen) Pichon.”105 The 
question of the Church's role consumed the diaspora and its press from 1919 
until the proclamation of the Grand Liban in September 1920. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The mahjar's wartime activism left important legacies for the Levant into the 
French Mandatory period, inaugurating lasting political connections between 
the emerging Syrian and Lebanese states and their emigrant populations. As 
this article has argued, emigrant activists participated in defining the Syrian 
and Lebanese national communities, using the press to work out a new 
geography, a new national narrative for the “Lebanese” or “Syrian” people. 
But the mahjar's influence did not stop there; many activists later returned to 
the Levant to fill important administrative posts. Daud and Iskandar 
ʿAmmun, for instance, waited out the war in Cairo, but in 1919 Daud 
returned to Lebanon to head the Lebanese Administrative Council in Baabda. 
Meanwhile, Iskandar relocated to Damascus and joined Emir Faysal's short-
lived Arab Nationalist government. Those who remained abroad also 
continued their activism. Naʿum Mukarzil pushed vigorously for the 
extension of Lebanese citizenship to emigrants living abroad.106 In 1921, he 
collaborated with the Maronite Church in conducting Lebanon's first official 
census, which enumerated emigrants alongside residents.107 The census set 
important precedents in the Lebanese state's project to assert a coherent 
national identity, and the inclusion of emigrants transformed them into 
stakeholders in Lebanese politics.108 
As a mahjari institution, the press presented this diaspora with a network 
which crisscrossed continents and which had its own political structures and 
gravity. Activists (themselves frequently journalists) found in the press an 
instrument for the creation of new national communities, and during the 
War, the Ottoman reading public became “Syrians” and “Lebanese,” armed 
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with new notions about the nation, its history, and its destiny.109 As the 
mahjar's printing capitals, São Paulo, Buenos Aires, and New York City 
shaped an entire generation of educated Syrian and Lebanese professionals 
with visions of the nation which, while competing, rested on certain parallels: 
a deeply historical (even irredentist) character, and faith in the culture of 
patriotism and the power of petitioning as politically progressive forces. The 
national political communities that emerged had significant transnational 
dimensions, and indeed the mahjar's involvement in mandate-era politics 
confirms this logic. Historians who work on political identity, nationalist 
culture, or citizenship issues in the modern mashriq must therefore move 
beyond its geographic boundaries and into its human geography, extending 
into pockets of Syrian and Lebanese culture in the Americas, Africa, and 
elsewhere.110 
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